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ments. This arrangement removes the attorney's incentive for
having the entire award lumped. It is commendable that Mis-
souri has adopted this construction.' Under the Illinois statute
allowing commutation when "for the best interests of the part-
ies," 112 the Illinois court could also easily reach this result and
reduce the excessive number of lump sum cases with which it has
had to deal.
Of course not all states can follow this recommended construc-
tion. Some commissions are limited by express statutory prohi-
bitions against making lump awards to attorneys,83 or else the
act requires agreement by both parties to any commutation."
In these instances only further legislation can free the courts
from the shackles of the present statutory provisions. It is re-
grettable that some lawyers have exploited a system which is
vital to the welfare of the industrial class and that they have
been accused of ambulance-chasing and appropriating payments
intended for indigent families. It would seem that the profession
itself, as well as the courts and legislatures, should be interested
in correcting the situation.
AARON E. HOTCHNER.
DAMAGES AND THE OIL AND GAS LEASE-
A PROBABLE MISSOURI APPROACH
I
In most litigation the careful practitioner will "hew to the
line," but in the field of damages apparently the inclination of
the most assiduous is to let the "chips fall where they may."
As a result, the theory upon which liability in a tort action is
built may be most meticulously woven, while an exorbitant claim
for damages, devoid of a measurement theory, may be presented
to the court in the sanguine expectation that the jury will award
a small portion of the plaintiff's request. This procedure seems
to be particularly characteristic where the case involves damages
that are uncertain and indefinite. Curiously enough, however, in
one situation where damages are admittedly very uncertain, con-
81. Wims v. Hercules Contracting Co. (Mo. App. 1939) 123 S. W. (2d)
225.
82. Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 48, sec. 146.
83. N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) sec. 34, 15-25; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) sec.
6532.
84. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 152, sec. 48; Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929)
sec. 48-140; Minn. Mason's Stats. (1927) sec. 4285.
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fusion occurs, not because the litigants fail to adopt a theory,
but rather because of ignorance as to which of several theories
they should follow.
In these cases, the harm for which redress is sought arises
where a lessee of an oil and gas lease fails to drill a well." The
covenant to drill, which forms all or a major part of the con-
sideration for the lease, is either expressly stated or will readily
be implied as a necessary part of the lease.2 Since self-help is
not an available remedy,8 the aggrieved lessor's recourse is in
the courts. 4 In a particular case the lessor may be given the
equitable relief of forfeiture5 or specific performance,0 but the
difficult problem of the appropriate measure of damages is pre-
sented when the lessor sues for pecuniary compensation.
The lessor must, of course, show a breach7 and substantial evi-
dence and proof of damages. 8 Courts agree that such proof can
be shown most reliably by expert oil operators and geologists."
Thus, where there is the requisite substantial evidence, courts
will let a case go to the jury, but there is no unanimity as to
the measure of damages the jury is required to apply.
Some courts, rather arbitrarily, limit the measure to the cost
of drilling.10 The reason assigned for so shackling the jury is
1. Where the drilling contract that is breached is simply one of hire
under which the defendant agreed to drill on land owned or leased by the
plaintiff, it is generally agreed that damages are the difference between the
cost of drilling and the contract price. North Healdton Oil and Gas Co. v.
Skelley (1916) 59 Okla. 128, 158 Pac. 1180; Covington Oil Co. v. Jones(Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 244 S. W. 287; Thuss, Texas Oil and Gas (1935)
sec. 231.
2. Crain v. Pure Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 824; Waggoner
Estate v. Sigler Oil Co. (1929) 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W. (2d) 27; Note(1939) 27 Cal. L. Rev. 314.
3. O'Neil v. Sun Co. (1909) 58 Tex. Civ. App. 167, 123 S. W. 172.
4. For a discussion of these cases by jurisdiction, see McCormick, Dam-
ages (1935) 113, n. 55.
5. 2 Summers, Oil and Gas Law (2d ed. 1938) 400, see. 431.
6. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co. (1929) 118 Tex. 509, 19 S. W.(2d) 27; Thuss, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 154.
7. Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen (1933) 248 Ky. 646, 59 S. W. (2d)534, 91 A. L. R. 890; Goodwin v. Standard Oil Co. of La. (C. C. A. 8, 1923)
290 Fed. 92.
8. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Williams (1933) 249 Ky. 242,
60 S. W. (2d) 580; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimmel (C. C. A. 10,
1934) 68 F. (2d) 520; 2 Summers, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 404, sec. 433.
9. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co. (1914) 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E. 308; Julian
Petroleum Corp. v. Courtney Petroleum Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1927) 22 F. (2d)
360; Comment (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 431.
10. Brown v. Homestake Exploration Corp. (1934) 98 Mont. 305, 39 P.(2d) 168; Okmulgee Producing & Refining Co. v. Baugh (1925) 111 Okla.
203, 239 Pac. 900; All-American Oil and Gas Co. v. Connellee (C. C. A. 5,
1925) 3 F. (2d) 107; Eysenback v. Cardinal Petroleum Co. (1925) 110
Okla. 12, 236 Pac. 10. Contra: Atlantic Oil Producing Co. v. Masterson(C. C. A. 5, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 481 (nominal damages).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/15
that any other measure of damages would be too speculative and
uncertain. The analogy of a building contract, where the de-
fendant in event of a breach must pay the construction cost, has
been tendered in defense of this formula."1 The answer seems
to be, however, that this is not a contract for hire, 2 but rather
a contract given in consideration for a lease in which the lessor
reserves the right to potential royalties.
More truly compensatory is the measure of damages which
awards the lessor the value of royalties he would have received
had the covenant to drill not been breached. 3 Such a measure
properly gives the plaintiff the benefit of his bargain and ade-
quate protection against loss from drainage by nearby wells.
While the damages are necessarily uncertain, expert testimony
should remove the jury's verdict from the realm of supposition
and conjecture. 1 4 However, the courts which adopt this measure
of damages seem to be effecting a marked departure from the
rather arbitrary distinction often maintained between the cer-
tainty of damages required in contract cases and the leniency
permitted in tort cases. Apparently disregarding any such dis-
tinction and approving a lost royalties measure, the Illinois Su-
preme Court" has ruled that:
The unliquidated damages growing either out of breach of
contract or the commission of a tort are seldom susceptible
of exact measurement. If such exactness were required, the
law of damages would be of little practical value.
A West Virginia decision's imposed a refinement on the lost
royalties measure. Because the oil remained in the ground, the
court felt that to allow a lessor royalties on oil not produced
would in effect award him double compensation. As a result, the
lessor was given the interest on the royalty money he should
have received. The Supreme Court of Texas in Texas Pacific
Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker"7 considered this West Virginia rule at
length, and, in rejecting it, called attention to the fact that it
11. See 2 Summers, op. cit. supra, note 5, at 412, sec. 434.
12. See note 1, supra.
13. Julian Petroleum Corp. v. Courtney Petroleum Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1927)
22 F. (2d) 360; Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co. (1914) 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E.
308; Guardian Trust Co. v. Brothers (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 59 S. W. (2d)
343; Fallis v. Julian Petroleum Corp. (1930) 108 Cal. App. 599, 292 Pac.
168.
14. See note 9, supra.
15. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co. (1914) 263 Ill. 518, 526, 105 N. E. 308.
16. Grass v. Big Creek Development Co. (1915) 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S. E.
750, L. R. A. 1915E. 1057.
17. (1928) 117 Tex. 418, 6 S. W. (2d) 1031, 60 A. L. R. 936.
1939] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
120 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
would be impossible to determine for how long a period interest
should be allowed. The lessee's remedy, it was ruled, lay in an
equitable action if and when he produced the oil upon which
royalties had been paid.
A case may arise where the plaintiff is the owner or holds
leases on acreage surrounding the leased property. In this fact
situation it has been held that the proper measure of damages
is the diminution in value of the plaintiff's leases resulting from
the defendant's breach of contract.18 While this measure is open
to the lack-of-certainty criticism, it would seem that here also
a fairly definite award of damages could be adduced from expert
testimony. One compelling virtue of this measure lies in its
ready applicability to leases in unproven or "wild cat" territory.
It has also been suggested that the lessor's damages should be
the value of the lease at the time it was granted to the lessee."0
This measure, however, "runs counter to a fundamental concept
of the law of damages, namely, that they are awarded as com-
pensation for the injury suffered, and not to restore the con-
sideration paid.120
Still another measure of damages has been promulgated by a
federal circuit court in Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter.21, Meeting
the demand for certainty of damages with the statement that
"where the cause and existence of damages has been established
with requisite certainty, recovery will not be denied because such
damages are difficult of ascertainment, '22 the court held that the
appropriate measure of damages was "the value of the services
rendered in obtaining [geological] information. ' ' 23 This case is
particularly interesting because, although speculative wildcat
property was involved, the court expressly refused to follow the
definite cost of drilling theory for a measure which it felt was
more truly compensatory. In adopting this theory, the courts
disregarded the rule of the Oklahoma state courts24 on the
18. Sanzenbacher v. Howard-Clay Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1922) 283 Fed.
13; Cotherman v. Oriental Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 272 S. W. 616,
where plaintiff's lease was forfeited as a result of defendant's breach of
contract.
19. Henry Oil Co. v. Head (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 163 S. W. 311.
20. Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter (C. C. A. 10, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 589,
591.
21. (C. C. A. 10, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 589. Discussed in comment (1930)
39 Yale L. J. 431. Accord: Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow (1930)
40 F. (2d) 488; (1931) 47 F. (2d) 1065.
22. Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter (C. C. A. 10, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 589,
592.
23. Id. at 593.
24. The cost of drilling measure. Eysenbach v. Cardinal Petroleum Co.(1925) 110 Okla. 12, 236 Pac. 10; Okmulgee Producing & Refining Co. v.
Baugh (1925) 111 Okla. 203, 239 Pac. 900.
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grounds that "the measure of damages for breach of contract is
a question of general jurisprudence." 25 This liberty, however, is
probably now denied the federal courts under the recent deci-
sion in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.26
II
Academic interest is always inspired by an unsettled field of
the law, but this abysmal confusion in the field of damages is
not without its practical significance. The lessor, who has an
actionable claim against his lessee for breach of covenant, may
find his right to recover dwindle into a Pyrrhic victory if, by
chance, he pleads the improper measure of damages. In Guar-
dian Trust Co. v. Brothers27 the appellants put the following ques-
tion: "Was the reasonable cost of drilling the well the correct
measure of damages for the breach of the contract? If it was
not, the plaintiffs, under their pleadings, were not entitled to
recover." The court then found that the cost of drilling was not
correct and affirmed a judgment awarding the plaintiffs nominal
damages. Hence, in both the pleading and trial stages, it is ex-
ceedingly important that the litigant know, if possible, what
measure his jurisdiction considers "correct."
It is, of course, difficult to know what theory of damages should
be pleaded in oil and gas cases until the court of the particular
state has announced which measure it considers appropriate.
No decision has been found in which any court of Missouri con-
sidered the problem, but Missouri's increased activity in oil28
makes a solution imminent.
The measure of damages which the Missouri courts will prob-
ably adopt is not entirely speculative; this is because of the com-
pelling similarity between the problems under an oil and gas
lease and those under a lease for solid minerals. This analogy
has been recognized and consistently followed in Illinois. The
Supreme Court of that state in the leading case of Daughetee v.
Ohio Oil Co.20 espoused the lost royalties rule in the case of an
oil and gas lease and consistently applied the same measure in
Stoddard v. Illinois Improvement and Ballast Co.,30 where a
25. Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow (1930) 40 F. (2d) 488, 493.
26. (1938) 304 U. S. 64.
27. (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 59 S. W. (2d) 343, 345.
28. (June 15, 1939) 38 Oil and Gas Journal, No. 5, p. 106; (June 22,
1939) 38 Oil and Gas Journal, No. 6, p. 97; (July 6, 1939) 38 Oil and
Gas Journal, No. 8, p. 59; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 2, 1939, p. 12a: 2(Oil bill in Missouri House); McQueen and Greene, 25 Geology of North-
western Missouri (2d series 1938) 47 ff.
29. (1914) 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E. 308.
30. (1916) 275 Ill. 199, 113 N. E. 913. Cf. Walker v. Tucker (1873)
70 I1. 527, 543 (lease of coal properties).
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lease of quarrying property was involved. The Missouri courts
have considered the problems arising under solid mineral leases
and have indicated, it is believed, their probable approach to oil
and gas lease cases.
Where the lessee has violated his obligation to develop mineral
properties, the Supreme Court has shown no hesitency to declare
forfeiture of the lease.3 . In Oliver v. Goetz32 forfeiture was al-
lowed, although not provided for in the lease, since the lessee's
inactivity was depriving the lessor of royalties, the agreed con-
sideration. It was admitted in Brooks v. Gaffin33 that other
courts might construe lease provisions as covenants and give
damages for their breach; but it was established that the Mis-
souri rule was to hold such provisions as conditions subsequent
and allow forfeiture. This rather liberal use of equitable relief,
however, may have been limited by a more recent decision
which suggests that the right to forfeiture must be expressly
reserved.
The Missouri courts have shown the same disposition to grant
relief to the aggrieved lessor when pecuniary remuneration was
sought for the lessee's breach of covenants to prospect or develop
property covered by zinc,35 coal,36 and iron ore37 leases. All these
cases, however, awarded specific damages that were provided for
in the leases. Although these cases have little probative value
in indicating what the courts will do when facing the typical suit
under an oil and gas lease, they do indicate that the courts are
ready to hold an objecting lessee to his bargain.
A more illuminating case on the specific problem under con-
sideration is Ragland v. Conqueror Zinc Co. 8 The defendant,
claiming to be the lessee of certain property, agreed to assign
the lease to the plaintiff, reserving a royalty of twenty per cent,
if the plaintiff's exploration showed minerals in paying quanti-
ties. The defendant, however, was unable to deliver a valid lease
and, after finding remunerative deposits of zinc, the plaintiff
brought this action to recover damages measured by the "worth"
31. Oliver v. Goetz (1894) 125 Mo. 370, 28 S. W. 441; Kirk v. Mattier
(1897) 140 Mo. 23, 41 S. W. 252; Brooks v. Gaffin (1905) 192 Mo. 228,
90 S. W. 808; Smith v. Eagle Coal and Mercantile Co. (1913) 170 Mo. App.
27, 155 S. W. 886; Ace Mining and Milling Co. v. R. U. Mining Co. (Mo.
1922) 247 S. W. 172.
32. (1894) 125 Mo. 370, 28 S. W. 441.
33. (1905) 192 Mo. 228, 90 S. W. 808.
34. (1913) 170 Mo. App. 27, 155 S. W. 886.
35. Leon v. Barnsdall Zinc Co. (1925) 309 Mo. 276, 274 S. W. 699.
36. Lennox v. Vandalia Coal Co. (1896) 66 Mo. App. 560.
37. Clark v. Midland Blast Furnace (1886) 21 Mo. App. 58.
38. (1909) 136 Mo. App. 631, 118 S. W. 1194.
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of the lease to him. The court found that "the profits which
plaintiff might have realized from a continuance of their mining
contract would be too uncertain and speculative as a basis for
recovery" 3 and approved an instruction which allowed the plain-
tiff only his prospecting expenses. Although the plaintiff suc-
cessfully established that his cause of action was not "specula-
tive" and stood ready to prove the full extent of his damages,
the court felt the evidence would be of such a nature that it
should not be considered by the jury. It seems clear, however,
that the evidence which the plaintiff wished to adduce was ex-
actly the type used to prove damages in jurisdictions which adopt
a lost royalties measure in oil and gas cases. The strictness of
the Ragland case is emphasized by the fact that, in almost an
identical situation, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the plain-
tiff was entitled to prove and recover "the value of the privilege"
he would have held under the lease. 40 While the Ragland case
is not a direct authority, it seems to weight the scales against
an adoption of the lost royalties measure of damages in Missouri.
This conclusion is also supported by non-lease cases where the
Missouri courts have refused substantial recovery because the
damages were speculative.4'
As indicated above, the forfeiture cases42 suggest that Mis-
souri courts are inclined to construe mineral leases in favor of
the lessor, which seems proper since such leases very often are
contracts of adhesion .4- On the other hand, the courts have shown
a hesitancy to accept other than a specific measure of damages.
It would seem to follow then, that of the prevalent theories of
recovery, the cost of drilling measure will probably be adopted
in Missouri. This measure does, in a very arbitrary way, grant
relief to the lessor and at the same time has the virtue of being
definite and calculable. In addition, an enunciation in Simons v.
Wittman 44 might prove to be a handy hook upon which to hang
an argument for the cost of drilling. There a building contract
had been breached; and it was found that, where the price had
been paid in advance, the proper damages were the value of the
completed building. As has been indicated,' 5 this analogy has
39. Id. at 636, 118 S. W. at 1196.
40. Chambers v. Brown (1886) 69 Iowa 213, 28 N. W. 561.
41. Sloan v. Paramore (1914) 181 Mo. App. 611, 164 S. W. 662; Weber
Implement Co. v. Acme Harvesting Mach. Co. (1916) 268 Mo. 363, 187
S. W. 874.
42. See notes 31-34, supra.
43. But see Note (1939) 27 Cal. L. Rev. 314.
44. (1905) 113 Mo. App. 357, 88 S. W. 791.
45. See note 11, supra.
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been successfully invoked in support of the cost of drilling
measure. -
There is language in United Real Estate Co. v. McDonald0
which indicates that the Missouri Supreme Court might follow
the rule adopted by a federal court,47 and award the lessor the
decrease in value of his leases where he owns property contigu-
ous to that of the lessee. In the United Real Estate Co. case, a
grantee had contracted to construct certain buildings on his
property. For breach of this contract, the court held the proper
award of damages would be the difference in the value of the
grantor's land with and without construction of the buildings.
Except for the United Real Estate Co. case, the past record
of the Missouri courts has been one requiring a demonstration
of certain damages. While this bespeaks the probable adoption
of the cost of drilling rule in oil and gas lease cases, it might be
preferable if the courts which are not bound by direct precedent,
were to adopt the lost royalties measure. In the overwhelming
number of cases, the purpose of the lease is the "mutually profit-
able production of oil, gas or other valuable minerals. 4 8 The
only value contemplated by the lessor is the value of the royalties
and, when no oil has been produced, the proper compensation is
not the lessee's cost of performance-the cost of drilling-but
the value of the royalties he should have received.
The ingrafted argument against this measure is that the dam-
ages are too speculative and indefinite. While the history of the
law of damages reflects the constant fear of an unbridled jury,
it would seem that under carefully admitted expert evidence and
accurate, succinct instructions neither the lessor nor the lessee
should fear the judgment of "twelve reasonable men."
JOHN ECKLER.
46. (1897) 140 Mo. 605, 41 S. W. 913.
47. Sanzenbacher v. Howard-Clay Oil Co. (1922) 283 Fed. 13. See note
18, supra.
48. Texas Co. v. Davis (1923) 113 Tex. 321, 333, 254 S. W. 304.
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